2016) Multicentre observational study of surgical system failures in aortic procedures and their effect on patient outcomes. Background: Vascular surgical care has changed dramatically in recent years with little knowledge of the impact of system failures on patient safety. The primary aim of this multicentre, observational study was to define the landscape of surgical system failures, errors and inefficiency (collectively termed failures) in aortic surgery. Secondary aims were to investigate determinants of these failures and their relationship with patient outcomes. Methods: Twenty vascular teams at ten English hospitals trained in structured, self-reporting of intraoperative failures (phase I). Failures occurring in open and endovascular aortic procedures were reported in phase II. Failure details (category, delay, consequence), demographic information (patient, procedure, team experience) and outcomes were reported. Results: There were strong correlations between the trainer and teams for the number and type of failures recorded during 88 procedures in phase I. In 185 aortic procedures, teams reported a median of 3 (i.q.r. 2-6) failures per procedure. Most frequent failures related to equipment (unavailability, failure, configuration, desterilization). Most major failures related to communication. Fourteen failures directly harmed 12 patients. Significant predictors of an increased failure rate were: endovascular compared with open repair (incidence rate ratio (IRR) for open repair 0.71, 95 per cent c.i. 0.57 to 0.88; P = 0.002), thoracic aneurysms compared with other aortic pathologies (IRR 2.07,
safety. Single-centre exploratory studies 4, 5 in arterial surgery identified failures related to team communication, surgical equipment and planning, but whether these failures occur at vascular centres throughout the country and, most importantly, their impact on patient outcomes remain unknown.
The mechanisms of harm, the determinants of increased failure rates and the impact of system failures on patient outcomes are important information to plan strategies for safety improvement.
The LEAP (Landscape of Error in Aortic Procedures) study is a multicentre, collaborative effort to explore patient safety in vascular surgery. The primary aim of the LEAP study was to define the landscape of surgical system failure, error and inefficiency in open and endovascular aortic surgery. Secondary aims were to investigate determinants of failure, and the relationship between intraoperative failure and patient outcomes.
+A: Methods
Phase I was a training phase to train teams and establish the reliability of a self-reporting method. In phase II, teams self-reported failures occurring in aortic procedures, the impact of these failures, and patient outcomes. Full research ethics committee (12-LO-0710) and local approvals from the participating organizations were obtained.
+B: Setting and participants
Participating operating teams were recruited in ten hospitals in England (September 2012 to July 2014). Operating teams consisted of a consultant vascular surgeon, anaesthetists, nurses and support staff, as well as radiology staff (radiologist and/or radiographer) for many procedures; team composition was not the same for all procedures owing to shift patterns and rotation of staff. For the training phase, all adult patients on participating vascular consultants' operating lists were eligible for inclusion in phase 1. However, in phase 2, only adult patients undergoing elective or urgent aortic surgery for aneurysm or aorto-occlusive disease were included. Staff and patients provided written, informed consent to participate.
+B: Materials
Twenty consultant vascular surgeons and their operating teams were trained by a single observer (a senior vascular nurse practitioner) to report intraoperative surgical system failures, errors and inefficiencies using a validated and structured, team-based approach. The Imperial College error capture record (ICECAP) is a paper-based tool consisting of several prompts read aloud to structure reporting of failures; its development and validation is described in full elsewhere 5 . Primary failure categories are: equipment, communication, procedure-independent pressures (distractions, team member absence, external pressures), technical, safety awareness and patient-related. Each of the primary categories has a number of secondary fields. For a failure to be recorded on ICECAP, the team had to come to a consensus on whether or not a failure had occurred, and on the category of failure.
+B: Definitions
A failure was as any event that prevented the procedure from progressing in an ideal manner. This broad definition was a deliberate attempt to capture all relevant safety events. The term failure encompasses different types: failures in the surgical system (system factors), human errors and sources of inefficiency. Failures were to be reported if they occurred between the patient being transferred into the operating theatre and final closure of the wound.
Major and minor failures were defined by their immediate consequences during surgery.
Failures that caused intraoperative delay of more than 15 min, caused harm, or placed the patient at significant risk of harm were referred to as major failures. Harm was defined as injury to the patient evidenced by a physiological response to the injury (such as cardiovascular instability), or by the need for further invasive intervention; harm may have occurred during the operation without further sequelae (lasting disability).
+B: Procedure and data collection

+C: Phase I
Shift patterns and staff rotation meant that the operating team composition was inconsistent; the trainer therefore undertook multiple visits to each site to capture as many operating staff as possible.
The trainer attended a median of 5 (range 4-6) procedures with each consultant vascular surgeon and team, to provide training to all key participating staff. At the beginning of the operating list, the trainer outlined the aims of the study, important definitions and protocol to the operating team.
During the procedure, the trainer recorded failures that occurred. At the end of the first procedure with the trainer present, the trainer led the team through the ICECAP debrief and completion of the written ICECAP record. Thereafter, a member of the team led the debrief, which took place in the same structured manner on each occasion. The trainer highlighted failures that she recorded to help teams to develop an understanding of the types of failure that should be reported. The trainer encouraged reflection and discussion between team members to enable a consensus to be reached regarding failures to be documented on the ICECAP record.
+C: Phase II
In the main study phase, each site aimed to collect data independently during 20 consecutive aortic procedures. Sites were asked to complete an aortic procedure log, indicating any interventions that were not recruited, with reasons. For each intervention, patient, procedure and team demographic data were collected, and the primary operator indicated whether he or she was unfamiliar with any of the equipment used. Details of each failure were recorded, including whether or not the patient was harmed, any corrective measures necessary to prevent harm, and the delay caused by the failure.
Postoperative complications were recorded for 30 days or until hospital discharge, whichever was sooner.
+B: Handling of data
Case report forms were collated and information entered into a purpose-built database at the lead site.
All failures were reviewed independently by two experienced clinical assessors, and categorized as major or minor, or excluded if they did not meet the study definition. Two independent assessors graded postoperative complications using the Clavien-Dindo system 6 . Grades III, IV and V are referred to as major complications.
+B: Statistical analysis
Agreement between assessors was assessed by means of Cohen's κ. Univariable and multivariable Poisson regression analysis was used to compare failure rates (failures per hour) for different patient, procedure and team groups, and the clustering effect resulting from potential variability in reporting styles at the hospital-site level was taken into account by using cluster robust standard errors. The variables included in the regression were: age, sex, ASA fitness grade, aortic pathology, procedure type (open surgical or endovascular), team member experience based on the number of similar operations performed (over 50 versus fewer than 6 similar procedures), and familiarity with equipment. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used to test for differences in the number of intraoperative failures and patient outcomes. All reported P values are two-sided. P < 0.050 was deemed to indicate statistical significance. Data were analysed in Stata ® version 12 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas, USA) by an independent statistician.
+A: Results
+B: Phase I
Eighty-eight procedures were included in phase I. The failure profiles reported by the trainer and in self-report by operating teams are summarized in Fig. 1 . The correlation between the trainer and operating teams for the number of failures identified per procedure was good (Spearman's ρ = 0.766, P < 0.001) and operating teams identified 95 per cent of major failures (18 of 19), indicating that they were able to follow study procedures and assess failure rates reliably. Table 1 .
+B: Phase II
+B: Failure characteristics
The operating teams recalled 930 failure events in total. Independent assessment excluded 131 events that did not meet the study definition for the following reasons: event did not occur during surgery (43; such as lack of intensive care bed delayed start of procedure); likely anticipated patient-related issue (72; for example, tortuous iliac arteries identified on preoperative imaging); and other (16). Of median failure rate was 1.0 (i.q.r. 0.6-2.0, range 0-6 per h. There was a significant correlation between the number of failures per procedure and the duration of operation (Spearman's ρ = 0.300, P < 0.001).
The details of failures are shown in Fig. 2 . Overall, most frequent failures related to equipment (33.9 per cent), usually non-availability, ranging from minor issues, such as nonavailability of the desired sheath size, to major failures, for example 'unavailability of the custommade thoracic stent graft, which was believed to be on site but was found not to be available after failures that led directly to intraoperative harm in 12 patients (6.5 per cent of study cohort), communication failures were reported by the team to have led to half of these harm-producing events ( Table 2 ). There were four technical errors that harmed patients directly. Three events related to unanticipated difficulties with the patient's anatomy. Although not a primary aim of the study, review of these failures indicated that additional factors, such as inexperience or a lack of vigilance, may also have played a role; harm was rarely the direct result of a single identifiable cause.
+B: Determinants of failure
Patient age, sex and ASA grade were not associated with increased failure rates in univariable analyses. There were also no significant differences in failures rates between levels of experience for all professions in the operating team. In multivariable regression, thoracic/arch aneurysms in comparison with other aortic pathologies (incidence rate ratio (IRR) 2.07, 95 per cent c.i. 1.39 to 3.08; P < 0.001) were significant predictors of increased failure rates. Of note, two-thirds of patients with thoracic/arch aneurysms in this cohort underwent either carotid subclavian bypass and thoracic endovascular repair (TEVAR) or custom-made TEVAR.
Unfamiliarity with equipment (IRR 1.52, 1.20 to 1.91; P < 0.001), and endovascular repair compared with open surgical approaches (IRR for open repair 0.71, 0.57 to 0.88; P = 0.002) were also significant predictors of failure. For major failure, only unfamiliarity with equipment was significantly associated with an increased failure rate (IRR 2.59, 1.51 to 4.28; P = 0.001).
+B: Association between intraoperative failures and patient outcomes
Some 152 of 171 procedures were successful technically with no adverse events at 24 h after surgery (data missing for 14 procedures). Thirteen patients required reoperation, 37 developed major complications, four had a prolonged hospital stay (over 30 days) and seven patients died. The total number of intraoperative failures was significantly higher in procedures requiring an unplanned return to theatre: median 5 (i.q.r. 4-10) versus 3 (2-6) for procedures with no further operation (P = 0.037).
The number of major intraoperative failures was also significantly higher in procedures subsequently requiring reoperation: median 1 (0-2.5) versus 0 (0-1) (P = 0.011). Significantly greater numbers of major failures were reported during procedures after which the patient developed a major complication: median 0 (0-1.5) versus 0 (0-1) for procedures followed by minor or no complications (P =0.029). Similarly, number of major errors was associated with death: median 1 (0-3) for procedures followed by death versus 0 (0-1) where the patient survived to discharge (P = 0.027) ( Fig.   3 ). There were no differences in the number of intraoperative failures occurring during successful versus unsuccessful procedures (3 (2-6) versus 5 (2-6); P = 0.147) or between regular and prolonged (over 30 days) hospital stay (3 (2-6) versus 4 (3-5); P = 0.837).
+A: Discussion
This large study in vascular surgery demonstrates that many avoidable safety failures relate to aspects of the surgical system, in addition to patient factors and technical expertise. This study links intraoperative safety failure with adverse outcomes in patients undergoing aortic surgery. In line with a smaller study of safety failures in cardiac surgery 7 , the present work shows that many failures leading to patient harm stem from failures in the system. Operating teams must recognize potential failures in the surgical system and endeavour to mitigate them.
The National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) is voluntary system for reporting adverse events and near misses that occur in healthcare. As such, it relies on the details submitted by the reporter and is inherently under-representative of the volume of events that occur 8 . The benefits of NRLS, in the same way as the LEAP study, come from analysing the report to identify themes, which can be targeted for improvement. A retrospective study of NRLS, aiming to identify the causes of patient harm in aortic surgery, demonstrated findings remarkably similar to those of the present study.
There is a clear need to address communication and equipment-related failures. A benefit of the ICECAP debriefing approach to identifying intraoperative failures is that it enables learning to take place locally, so that improvement measures can be implemented immediately.
Intraoperative failures appear to have a significant effect on operating theatre efficiency, as well as patient safety. Nearly two-thirds of errors caused intraoperative delays in procedural workflow, with more than 90 h lost over 185 procedures. Since the average cost of running an operating theatre exceeds £1200 per h (€1443 per h; exchange rate 28 June 2016) 9 , by avoiding these procedural delays the potential cost savings would be great for each institution.
It has been demonstrated that error rates vary between operation types, with procedures relying on technology, such as those in vascular or cardiac surgery 7 , having the highest rates of total and equipment-related error. The present study has expanded on the findings of previous singlecentre studies, demonstrating that endovascular procedures are consistently associated with more failures than open surgical operations. Although minimally invasive surgery has undoubtedly reduced surgical morbidity and mortality rates, to achieve optimal, safe and efficient outcomes avoidable error must be minimized. The increased rates of error during endovascular versus open surgical procedures may be explained by the rapidly evolving nature of the endovascular field, more challenging technology and the increased number of new devices on the market, resulting in an extensive and changing learning curve. Thoracic/arch aortic aneurysms predicted higher failure rates than infrarenal or juxtarenal aortic procedures, which may be explained by their relative technical difficulty.
In the present study, perceived unfamiliarity with equipment significantly predicted increased rates of intraoperative failures, whereas actual experience (in terms of the number of operations performed) did not. Vascular operating teams are using an increasingly wide range of stent-graft devices in order to treat patients with a broad range of anatomical configurations, and the large number of devices being used is a factor contributing to unfavourable results 10 . Operators planning to introduce a new interventional device have a responsibility to ensure that the introduction of new equipment is accompanied by adequate training, and fulfils safety and financial regulations within their institution. This may include gaining approval from the divisional board and new procedures committee, ensuring that protocols are in place, and ensuring there is a robust structure for audit and evaluation. In reality, however, new devices and equipment are regularly introduced into the operating environment. Currently, it is unclear who is ultimately responsible for training endovascular operators and their teams, whether industry or healthcare institutions, when new devices become available for use in patients. New-device training requires attention to improve patient safety.
Communication failures represented a significant proportion of major errors reported in the study, and contributed to half of all intraoperative harm events. Complex aortic procedures demand precise communication and collaboration from increasingly large and multidisciplinary operating teams. This study was undertaken in the UK, where, similar to many European institutions, surgeons and interventional radiologists commonly collaborate to perform endovascular procedures. Dual consultant operating has also become routine practice. Rotation of operating staff is commonplace and, as a result, team members may not work together regularly. Consequently, effective leadership and teamwork are challenging in this high-risk environment, yet training in these essential nontechnical skills is not routine practice, despite the evidence of a relationship between teamwork and patient outcomes 11 .
This study highlights the need to address human factor skills (such as communication, teamworking, leadership) and system factors (equipment planning, provision and maintenance, pressures on the operating team and their environment, provision of training) that may influence patient outcomes in aortic surgery, while continuing to optimize the patient's preoperative condition and technical expertise among surgeons. A substantial proportion of equipment failures were due to nonavailability, failure or configuration, suggesting that there are clear advantages to implementing protocols to reduce equipment-related error. Procedure-specific equipment checks could be incorporated into the WHO's surgical safety checklist 12 , specially adapted for aortic repair.
The provision of teamwork and leadership training for vascular operating teams is crucial to improve patient outcomes. Team simulations have been shown to be a powerful tool for training and improving the technical and non-technical skills required to perform endovascular aortic aneurysm repair and complex cardiovascular procedures, and may be particularly useful for rehearsal of crisis scenarios 13 .
A clear limitation of this study is self-reporting, which is likely to be influenced by cognitive biases, clinical processes (such as production pressure) and individual reporting styles 14 . To minimize the impact of this limitation, the ICECAP tool was used immediately after the procedure to structure postoperative team self-reporting of failures, which has been shown to reduce recall bias 5 . Although independent observation is not susceptible to primacy and recency bias effects, and is an alternative to collecting data on intraoperative failures, it is relatively time-consuming and expensive, and may influence operating team behaviours (Hawthorne effect). A further potential limitation of self-report is selective reporting. As the aortic procedure log was completed poorly across participating sites, it is not clear whether consecutive patients were recruited into the study. In an ideal study environment, consistent teams would have been necessary for data reporting. This study aimed to capture real-world intraoperative failures, so the fact that teams were inconsistent provided an honest report. Finally, the number of patients with adverse outcomes was small, so the assessment of between-group differences for failure and patient outcomes was not adjusted for multiple comparisons. The association between intraoperative failures and patient outcomes should be part of future research programmes to further validate these findings. Values in parentheses are percentages unless indicated otherwise; *values are mean(s.d.) (range). †Endovascular procedure with additional intervention besides femoral cut down for arterial access. AAA, abdominal aortic aneurysm; EVAR, endovascular aneurysm repair. 'Misleading communication led to wrong clamps being taken off the graft…substantial blood loss, which was 'hidden' and went unnoticed leading to severe hypotension in a patient with significant co-morbidity' (hybrid open visceral artery retrograde revascularizsation and endovascular thoracoabdominal aneurysm repair)
+A: Collaborators
'Communication failure and discord between surgeons and scrub nurse during bleeding. Scrub nurse unfamiliar with use of pledgeted sutures to repair internal iliac vein injury. Miscommunication led to a further tear in vein as sutures were pulled out. Patient became acutely unstable' (EVAR with surgical ligation of IIA)
'Wrong sized limb placed necessitating embolization of IIA' (EVAR and left to right femorofemoral artery crossover graft)
'Wrong incision due to lack of communication between radiology and surgical teams' (aortouniiliac and femorofemoral artery crossover graft)
'Lack of communication between surgeons and anaesthetist regarding degree of blood loss. Change of consultant anaesthetist mid-procedure -patient not transfused after initial 2 units. Miscommunication with blood transfusion laboratory -delay in receiving cross-matched blood for hypovolaemic patient' (thoracic EVAR)
